His face is turned towards the past.... The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole that which has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irrestistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.
incarnated in women. The Passage rehearses this temporal logic: progress through the ascending doors, from primitive pre-history, bereft of language and light, through the epic stages of colonialism, post-colonialism and enlightened hybridity. Leaving the exhibit, history is traversed backwards. As in colonial discourse, the movement forward in space is backwards in time: from erect, verbal consciousness and hybrid freedomsignified by the (not very free) white rabbit called "Free" which roams the exhibit -down through the historic stages of decreasing stature to the shambling, tongueless zone of the pre-colonial, from speech to silence, light to dark.
The paradox structuring the exhibit intrigues me, as it is a paradox, I suggest, that shapes the term "post-colonialism." I am doubly interested in the term, since the almost ritualistic ubiquity of "post-" words in current culture (post-colonialism, post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-cold war, post-marxism, post-apartheid, post-Soviet, post-Ford, post-feminism, post-national, post-historic, even post-contemporary) signals, I believe, a widespread, epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical "progress."
In 1855, the year of the first imperial Paris Exposition, Victor Hugo announced : "Progress is the footsteps of God himself." "Post-colonial studies" has set itself against this imperial idea of linear time -the "grand idea of Progress and Perfectability," as Baudelaire called it. Yet the term "post-colonial," like the exhibit itself, is haunted by the very figure of linear "development" that it sets out to dismantle. Metaphorically, the term "post-colonialism" marks history as a series of stages along an epochal road from "the pre-colonial," to "the colonial," to "the post-colonial" -an unbidden, if disavowed, commitment to linear time and the idea of "development." If a theoretical tendency to envisage "Third World" literature as progressing from "protest literature," to "resistance literature," to "national literature" has been criticized as rehearsing the Enlightenment trope of sequential, "linear" progress, the term "post-colonialism" is questionable for the same reason. Metaphorically poised on the border between old and new, end and beginning, the term heralds the end of a world era, but within the same trope of linear progress that animated that era.
If "post-colonial" theory has sought to challenge the grand march of western historicism with its entourage of binaries (self-other, metropoliscolony, center-periphery, etc.), the term "post-colonialism" nonetheless re-orients the globe once more around a single, binary opposition: colonial/ post-colonial. Moreover, theory is thereby shifted from the binary axis of power (colonizer/colonized -itself inadequately nuanced, as in the case of women) to the binary axis of time, an axis even less productive of political nuance since it does not distinguish between the beneficiaries of colonialism (the ex-colonizers) and the casualties of colonialism (the ex-colonized). The "post-colonial scene" occurs in an entranced suspension of history, as if the definitive historical events have preceded us, and are not now in the making. If the theory promises a decentering of history in hybridity, syncreticism, multi-dimensional time, and so forth, the singularity of the term effects a re-centering of global history around the single rubric of European time. Colonialism returns at the moment of its disappearance.
The word "post," moreover, reduces the cultures of peoples beyond colonialism to prepositional time. The term confers on colonialism the prestige of history proper; colonialism is the determining marker of history. Other cultures share only a chronological, prepositional relation to a Euro-centered epoch that is over (post-), or not yet begun (pre-). In other words, the world's multitudinous cultures are marked, not positively by what distinguishes them, but by a subordinate, retrospective relation to linear, European time.
The term also signals a reluctance to surrender the privilege of seeing the world in terms of a singular and ahistorical abstraction. Rifling through the recent flurry of articles and books on "post-colonialism," I am struck by how seldom the term is used to denote multiplicity. The following proliferate: "the post-colonial condition," the post-colonial scene," "the post-colonial intellectual," "the emerging disciplinary space of post-colonialism," "post-coloniality," "the post-colonial situation," "post-colonial space," "the practice of postcoloniality," "post-colonial discourse," and that most tedious, generic hold-all: "the post-colonial Other." I am not convinced that one of the most important emerging areas of intellectual and political enquiry is best served by inscribing history as a single issue. Just as the singular category "Woman" has been discredited as a bogus universal for feminism, incapable of distinguishing between the varied histories and imbalances in power among women, so the singular category "post-colonial" may license too readily a panoptic tendency to view the globe within generic abstractions voided of political nuance. The arcing panorama of the horizon becomes thereby so expansive that international imbalances in power remain effectively blurred. Historically voided categories such as "the other," "the signifier," "the signified," "the subject," "the phallus," "the postcolonial," while having academic clout and professional marketability, run the risk of telescoping crucial geo-political distinctions into invisibility.
The authors of the recent book The Empire Writes Back, for example, defend the term "post-colonial literature" on three grounds: it "focuses on that relationship which has provided the most important creative and psychological impetus in the writing"; it expresses the "rationale of the grouping in a common past," and it "hints at the vision of a more liberated and positive future."3 Yet the inscription of history around a single "continuity of preoccupations" and "a common past," runs the risk of a fetishistic disavowal of crucial international distinctions that are barely understood and inadequately theorized. Moreover, the authors decided, idiosyncratically to say the least, that the term "post-colonialism" should not be understood as everything that has happened since European colonialism, but rather everything that has happened from the very beginning of colonialism, which means turning back the clocks and unrolling the maps of "post-colonialism" to 1492, and earlier. as in 1955) . In 1980, the annual production of films in the continent was 70. In contrast, the production of long films in Asia was 2,300 in 1965, and 2,100 in 1987.9 The film industry in India remains the largest in the world, while Africa's share of TV receivers, radio transmittors and electronic hardware is miniscule.
The term "post-colonialism" is prematurely celebratory and obfuscatory in more ways than one. The term becomes especially unstable with respect to women. In a world where women do 2/3 of the world's work, earn 10% of the world's income, and own less than 1% of the world's property, the promise of "post-colonialism" has been a history of hopes postponed. It has generally gone unremarked that the national bourgeoisies and kleptocracies that stepped into the shoes of "post-colonial" "progress," and industrial "modernization" have been overwhelmingly and violently male. No "post-colonial" state anywhere has granted women and men equal access to the rights and resources of the nation state. Not only have the needs of "post-colonial nations" been largely identified with male conflicts, male aspirations and male interests, but the very representation of "national" power rests on prior constructions of gender power. Thus even for Fanon, who at other moments knew better, both "colonizer" and "colonized" are unthinkingly male: "The look that the native turns on the settler is a look of lust... to sit at the settlers' table, to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife, if possible. The colonized man is an envious man."'? Despite most anti-colonial nationalisms' investment in the rhetoric of popular unity, most have served more properly to institutionalize gender power. Marital laws, in particular have served to ensure that for women citizenship in the nation-state is mediated by the marriage relation, so that a woman's political relation to the nation is submerged in, and subordinated to, her social relation to a man through marriage.
The global militarization of masculinity, and the feminization of poverty have thus ensured that women and men do not live "post-coloniality" in the same way, or share the same singular "post-colonial condition." In most countries, IMF and World Bank policy favoured cash-cropping and capital surplus in the systematic interests of men, and formed a predictable pattern where men were given the training, the international aid, the machinery, the loans and cash. In Africa, women farmers produce 65%-80% of all agricultural produce, yet do not own the land they work, and are consistently by-passed by aid programs and "development" projects.
The blame for women's continuing plight cannot be laid only.at the door of colonialism, or footnoted and forgotten as a passing "neo-colonial" dilemma. The continuing weight of male economic self-interest and the varied undertows of patriarchal Christianity, Confucianism, and Islamic fundamentalism continue to legitimize women's barred access to the corridors of political and economic power, their persistent educational disadvantage, the bad infinity of the domestic double day, unequal childcare, gendered malnutrition, sexual violence, genital mutilation, and domestic battery. The histories of these male policies, while deeply implicated in colonialism, are not reducible to colonialism, and cannot be understood without distinct theories of gender power.
Finally The first seismic shift in the idea of "progress" came with the abrupt shift in US Third World policy in the 1980's. Emboldened in the 1950's by its economic "great leap forward" (space, again, is time), the US was empowered to insist globally that other countries could "progress" only if they followed the US road to mass-consumption prosperity. W. W. Rostow's "Non-Communist Manifesto" envisaged the so-called "developing" nations as passing through similar stages of development, out of tradition-bound poverty, through an industrialized modernization overseen by the US, the World Bank and the IMF, to mass-consumer prosperity. Nonetheless, except for the Japanese "miracle" and the Four Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea), the vast majority of the world's populations have, since the 1940's, come to lag even further behind the consumer standards set by the west." Then, between 1979 (the second oil shock) and 1982 (the Mexican default), the world economy began to creak. Increasingly, it became clear that the US was no longer destined to be the only economic power of the future. Hobbled by its phenomenal debts, and increasingly diminished by the twin shadows of Japan and Germany, the US summarily abandoned the doctrine of global "progress" and "development." During the Reagan era, the US instituted instead a bullying debt-servicing policy towards poorer countries, bolstered by aggressive competition with them on the market, and defended by sporadic fits of military gangsterism, as in Grenada and Panama. The cataclysmic war in the Gulf served only to underscore the point.
For many poorer countries, the shift in US policy meant abandoning overnight the fata morgana of capitalist "progress," and settling for chronically stricken positions in the global hierarchy. Henceforth, they could aspire only to tighten their belts, service their debts, and maintain some credit. In 1974, Africa's debt-service ratio was a manageable 4.6 %. Thirteen years later it had rocketted to 25%.12 But the collapse of the US model of "progress" has also meant the collapse, for many regimes, of the legitimacy of their national policies, in the panicky context of world-wide economic crisis, ecological calamity, and spiralling popular desperation. The Four "miracle" Tigers have paid for progress with landscapes pitted with poisoned water, toxic soil, denuded mountains and dead coral seas. In "miracle" Taiwan, an estimated 20% of the country's farmland is polluted by industrial waste, and 30% of the rice crops contain unsafe levels of heavy metals, mercury and cadmium.21 A World Bank report in 1989 concluded gloomily that "adjustment programs" carry the by-product that "people below the poverty line will probably suffer irreparable damage in health, nutrition and education."22 Now Japan, insatiably hungry for timber and raw resources, is the major foreign aid donor, to the tune of $10 billion. In short, the World Bank and IMF "road to progress" has proved a short road to what Susan George has called "a fate worse than debt."
To compound matters, the collapse of the US myth of "progress" was swiftly followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which dragged down with it an entire master narrative of communist "progress." The zig-zag of Hegelian-Marxist "progress," managed by a bureaucratic, command economy, had been destined to arrive ineluctably at its own utopian destination. The toppling of the Soviet Empire has meant, for many, the loss of a certain privileged relation to history as the epic unfolding of linear, if spasmodic progress, and with it the promise that the bureaucratic, communist economy could one day outstrip the US in providing consumer abundance for all. As a result, there has also been some loss of political certitude in the inevitable role of the male (and, as it turns out, white) industrial working-class as the privileged agent of history. If the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union fell, it was not under the weight of popular, industrial mobilization, but rather under the double weight of its economic corruption and manic military spending. The irony is not lost that the ascendant economies of Japan and Germany were historically denied the unsupportable burden of the arms race. Thus, despite the fact that men are slaughtering each other around the globe with increased dedication, there has been a certain loss of faith in masculine militarism as the inevitable guarantee of historical "progress." For the first time in history, moreover, the idea of industrial "progress" impelled by technocratic "development" is meeting the limits of the world's natural resources.
Ironically, the last zone on earth to embrace the ideology of capitalist "development" may be the one now controlled by Mr Yeltsin and his allies. The world has watched awestruck as Yeltsin and his fellowtravellors swerved dizzyingly off the iron road of the centralized, communist, command economy, and lurched bumpily onto the capitalist road of decentralization, powered no longer by the dialectic as the motor and guarantee of "progress," but by tear-away competition and mad marketeering. Never mind that this swerve is likely to unleash a disaster on a scale comparable to the famines that followed the original Bolshevik revolution, nor that the rough beast that slouches out of the chaos may, indeed, not be western capitalism at all, but a particularly grisly form of fascism.
For both communism and capitalism, "progress" was both a journey forward and the beginning of a return; for as in all narratives of "progress," to travel the "road of progress" was to cover, once again, a road already travelled. The metaphor of the "road" or "railway" guaranteed that "progress" was a fait accompli. The journey was possible because the road had already been made (by God, the Dialectic, the Weltgeist, the Cunning of History, the Law of the Market, Scientific Materialism). As Hegel decreed, "progress" in the realm of history was possible because it has already been accomplished in the realm of "truth." But now, if the owl of Minerva has taken flight, there is widespread uncertainty whether it will return. The collapse of both capitalist and communist teleologies of "progress" has resulted in a doubled and overdetermined crisis in images of future time. The uncertain global situation has spawned a widespread sense of historic abandonment, of which the apocalytic, time-stopped prevalence of "post-" words is only one symptom. The storm of "progress" had blown for both communism and capitalism alike. Now the wind is stilled, and the angel with hunched wings broods over the wreckage at its feet. In this calm at "the end of history," the millenium has come too soon, and the air seems thick with omen.
Francis Fukuyama has declared history dead. Capitalism, he claims, has won the grand agon with communism, and is now "post-historic." Third World countries lag behind in the zone of the "historic," where matters are decided by force.23 Far from the "end of history" and the triumph of US consumer capitalism, however, the new order of the day is most likely to be multi-polar competition between the four currently decisive regions of the world: Japan, the United States, Fortress Europe, and the Middle East. The arms trade will continue, as the military-industrial wizards of Armageddon turn their attention from cold war scenarios to multiple, dispersed wars of attrition, fought by the US mercenary army and other proxies, and paid for by Japan and Germany. Within the US, with the vanishing of international communism as a rationale for militarism, new enemies will be found: the drug war, international "terrorism," Japan, feminists, the PC hordes and "tenured radicals," lesbians and gays, and any number of international "ethnic" targets.
For this reason, there is some urgency in the need for innovative theories of history and popular memory, particularly mass-media memory. Asking what single term might adequately replace "post-colonialism," for example, begs the question of rethinking the global situation as a multiplicity of powers and histories, which cannot be marshalled obediently under the flag of a single theoretical term, be that feminism, marxism, or post-colonialism. Nor does intervening in history mean lifting, again, the mantle of "progress" or the quill-pen of empiricism. "For the native," as Fanon said, "objectivity is always against him." Rather, a proliferation of historically nuanced theories and strategies is called for, which may enable us to engage more effectively in the politics of affiliation, and the currently calamitous dispensations of power. Without a renewed will to intervene in the unacceptable, we face being becalmed in an historically empty space in which our sole direction is found by gazing back, spellbound, at the epoch behind us, in a perpetual present marked only as "post."
